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This article proposes a value which can be considered an extension of the Banzhaf value
for cooperative games. The proposed value is defined on the class of j-cooperative games,
i.e., games in which players choose among a finite set of ordered actions and the result
depends only on these elections. If the output is binary, only two options are available, then
j-cooperative games become j-simple games. The restriction of the value to j-simple games
leads to a power index that can be considered an extension of the Banzhaf power index for
simple games. The paper provides an axiomatic characterization for the value and the index
which is closely related to the first axiomatization of the Banzhaf value and Banzhaf power
index in the respective contexts of cooperative and simple games.
Key words: An extension of the Banzhaf value; Axiomatic characterization of values; Multi-
choice games; UNSC voting system; Grading
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1 Introduction
The Banzhaf power index is possibly the most-recognized measure for evaluating the a priori power
of players in a simple game. The index was independently proposed by three authors: Penrose [19],
Banzhaf [1] and Coleman [5]. A little later Owen [17] extended the power index to a value for
cooperative games, which is known as the Banzhaf value.
Players only have two possible actions in the contexts of cooperative games and simple games.
It is natural, therefore, to consider more general models in which players have a greater number of
allowed ordered actions for cooperative games or several degrees of compliance in simple games.
A multi-choice game, considered by Hsiao and Raghavan [15, 16], is a generalization of a
cooperative game in which each player has several ordered activity levels in the sense that, for
every pair of different actions one action carries more ‘weight’ than the other action. The last level
of activity is reserved for players without any activity. Cooperative games form a subclass of the
class of multi-choice games.
∗The author is with the Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (Campus Manresa), in the Department of Mathe-
matics; e-mails: josep.freixas@upc.edu, postal address: EPSEM, Avda. Bases de Manresa, 61-73, E-08242 Manresa,
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Extensions of simple games are mainly proposed in [9] for voting games including abstention
as an intermediate vote between ‘yes’ and ‘no’, and in [13] a more general model was proposed,
that of (j, k)-simple games, a class of voting games in which voters may choose any of j ordered
levels of approval and k stands for the number of possible aggregated ordered results. The work
in [13] provides a notion of weighted game endorsed by characterizations of the property of trade-
robustness. If k = 2 the output has only two choices and the game is called j-simple game.
In this paper we propose a value that extends the Banzhaf value to j-cooperative games and
to j-simple games, where j-cooperative games is a slightly different more convenient adaptation of
multi-choice games, because its restriction to the binary case for the output gives rise to j-simple
games. As shown below the proposed value gives an a priori valuation for each player in the game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some examples of j-cooperative games are pre-
sented in the remainder of this section. Section 2 introduces some formal preliminaries, the contexts
of j-cooperative games and j-simple games, and the definition of a value in these contexts that
extends the Banzhaf value for cooperative games. The main Section 3 provides an axiomatization
for the value. Examples are revisited in Section 4 and the Conclusion ends the paper in Section 5.
1.1 Some examples
In this subsection, we present some examples to illustrate the versatility of the kind of games
we consider. In describing these examples we use some intuitive terminology which is concisely
defined in next section. A value that captures the idea of the Banzhaf value for cooperative games
is proposed in Section 2 for a more general context.
Example 1.1 (A team of workers) A team of three workers have to perform a task. All three
can carry out their task at three different levels: full involvement, medium involvement and lack
of involvement. Only one of them, called a, is qualified to operate a machine that is essential to
achieve a satisfactory execution of the work to be done. The other two workers, called b and c,
play a symmetrical role and also turn out to be indispensable together and a lack of involvement
on the part of the two would be fatal for the execution of the task. Other combinations for these
two workers with at least a medium involvement by worker a lead to more or less satisfactory
results depending on the degree of involvement for these two workers. Full involvement by the




4− |S2| − 2|S3| if a ∈ S1
max {0, |S1| − |S3|} if a ∈ S2
0 if a ∈ S3
where S = (S1, S2, S3) and S1 contains the workers with full involvement, S2 contains the workers
with an intermediate involvement, and S3 contains the rest of workers with the lowest level of
involvement.
If we do not have any information about workers attitude, how should the total gain be dis-
tributed among them?
Example 1.2 (Grading) The evaluation of a subject consists of three independent tests, a, b
and c. Each test is rated with an integer mark in between 1 and 7, both included. To pass the
subject requires that:
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i) the sum of the three grades obtained exceeds half of the possible points,
ii) a minimum grade of 3 is required for the test a, and
iii) a minimum of 4 is required for the average of tests b and c.
The question we face is: what is the a priori importance of each test for the evaluation of the
subject? Alternatively, consider the same question if instead, each test is rated with an integer
mark in between 1 and 6 and the minimum average of 4 required in condition iii) is replaced by
3.5.
Example 1.3 (The UNSC voting system) As noted by [10] the United Nations Security Coun-
cil (UNSC) can be modeled as a 3-simple game: a resolution is approved if there are at least nine
members in favor and permanent members are not against it. This means that also if some of
the permanent members abstain, without explicitly imposing the veto, a resolution can be carried
on. The resulting game v has 15 players, with the subset P of the five permanent member, and a
tripartition S = (S1, S2, S3) is winning (i.e., v(S) = 1) if and only if
|S1| ≥ 9 and S3 ∩ P = ∅.
where S1 contains the members in favor of the resolution, S3 the members against it, and S2 the
abstainers. For further discussion on this significant system see for example [6].
The UNSC is critical to global peace and security, yet more than twenty years of negotiations
over its reform have proved fruitless, see in [14] a survey on several proposed reforms that have
not been implemented. A minimal modification of the UNSC voting game is proposed here. It
consists in just modifying the possibility of approval of a resolution if one permanent member is
against it but all the other members are in favor of it. This means that for any permanent member
p ∈ P , the five losing tripartitions (N \ {p}, ∅, {p}) of the current system convert into winning
tripartitions, and this is the only difference between the current and the proposed UNSC voting
system. The inclusion of these five tripartitions in the set of winning tripartitions prevents the
permanent members to have veto-right, but this situation only occurs when the other fourteen
countries agree to vote in favor of the resolution at hand.
2 Preliminaries on j-cooperative games
We formally introduce the class of games we deal with in this paper, the notions are mainly taken
from [13].
Let N be a finite set of players. A j-partition of N is a collection of j mutually disjoint subsets
of N , S1, . . . , Sj such that ∪jk=1Sk = N . Note that any Si may be empty. Any subset S of N is
called a coalition and we denote its cardinality by s.
A j-partition describes a division of players among j alternatives or j levels of voting approval
or j possible actions or choices players can realize or choose. We assume that these j different
alternatives are ordered and convey that level 1 corresponds to the highest level of performance,
while the last, level j, corresponds to the lowest level. Thus, players in S1 are those who work at
the highest level, while those in Sj work at the lowest level of activity. In a voting context, voters
in S1 are those who vote for the highest level of approval, whereas those in Sj are those who vote
for the lowest level of approval. Thus, the convention chosen is ordinal rather than numerical.
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From now on we denote with JN the set of all j-partitions on N endowed with an (strict) order
from the first (highest) order of performance or activity to the last (lowest) one. Although we
assume an order of the levels of activity, we do not do any assumption over the quantification of
these levels. Thus, acting at the second level just means that such level of activity is lower than
in level 1 but greater than in level 3.
A partial order ⊆j on the set JN is considered. If S, T ∈ JN , then S ⊆j T means Sk ⊆j
⋃k
i=1 Ti
for any k = 1, . . . , j − 1. In words, S is contained in T if players in T are working or voting in
the same or in a higher level than in S. We use S ⊂j T if S ⊆j T and S 6= T . The j-partitions
N = (∅, . . . , ∅, N) and M = (N, ∅, . . . , ∅) are respectively the minimum and maximum for the
order ⊆j.
A binary voting situation in which voters (we use the term voters instead of the term players in
the voting context) can vote among several ordered alternatives can be formalized by a (j, 2)-simple
game, i.e., voters can vote in j different ordered ways to approve or reject a resolution and the
aggregate output is binary. As previously said, we refer to (j, 2)-simple game as j-simple games
throughout this article.
Definition 2.1 Let N be a finite set and JN be the set of all totally ordered j-partitions on N .
A j-simple game is a function v : JN → {0, 1} such that: i) it is monotonic: if S ⊂j T then
v(S) ≤ v(T ); ii) v(N ) = 0 and v(M) = 1.
We denote with SJ N the space of all j-simple games on the finite set N . Note that (2, 2)-simple
games are simple games since for any bipartition S = (S1, S2) the first component S1 is identified
with the set of ‘yes’-voters and S2 = N \ S1 with the set of ‘no’-voters. Thus, any bipartition is in
one-to-one correspondence with coalition S1. Note also that (3, 2)-simple games can be interpreted
as ternary voting games, as considered by [9], if the first level of approval correspond to voting
‘yes’, the second level to abstain and the third level to voting ‘no’.
The set of winning j-partitions of v is denoted by W (v) = {S ∈ JN : v(S) = 1} and the set of
minimal winning j-partitions by Wm(v) = {S ∈ W (v) : T /∈ W (v) if T⊂j S}.
In any j-simple game the aggregated output set is binary and represented by {0, 1}, where
these two numbers have the respective meaning that the submitted proposal is either defeated or
passed.
Definition 2.2 Let N be a finite set and JN be the set of all totally ordered j-partitions on N . A
j-cooperative game is a function v : JN → R such that v(N ) = 0.
We denote by JN the space of j-cooperative games on the finite setN . Note that a 2-cooperative
game corresponds to a cooperative game in which the bipartition S = (S1, N \ S1) is identified
with the coalition S1 formed by players who decide to cooperate.
The previous definition is almost equivalent to that of a multi-choice game as defined in [15, 16].
A distinction is that in the multi-choice setting an input level is distinguished from the others and
it is reserved for the lack of activity. In our context the last input level does not necessarily mean a
total lack of activity and this becomes clear in the voting context, for j-simple games. For instance,
for ternary voting games [10] (j = 3 with three input choices: voting ‘yes’, ‘abstain’ or voting ‘no’)
the last input level means voting against the submitted proposal, which would not be coherent
with the assumption made in the multi-choice model. The inactivity level for a multichoice game
could be interpreted as void vote or absence to the vote, which in voting is a very sensitive issue
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since in certain voting systems (for example with quorums see [13, 22]) an absence can be more
harmful than a negative vote.
There are many interesting subclasses of cooperative games that can easily be extended to
j-cooperative games for j > 2. Here we just refer to monotonicity since the most of the modeled
situations fulfill this property.
A j-cooperative game is monotonic, if for any pair of j-partitions S and T , such that S ⊂j T
then v(S) ≤ v(T ). the examples we consider are monotonic.
As we shall see JN is a vectorial space of dimension jn − 1 and a basis formed by monotonic
j-cooperative games is the one of unanimity games defined as:
uS(T ) =
{
1, if S ⊆j T
0, otherwise,
for all j-partition S 6= N .
2.1 A value for j-cooperative games
Let us introduce the following notation. From a given j-partition S, we define the j-partition Sa↓k
in which player a ∈ S1 has moved from the highest level of activity 1 to the inferior level k (k > 1).
Sa↓k = (S1 \ {a}, . . . , Sk ∪ {a}, . . . , Sj)
for any k = 2, . . . , j. When necessary we identify Sa↓1 with S.
The idea we pursue with this definition is to consider a special type of marginal contributions
for j-partitions in a given game v:
mk(v, S, a) = v(S)− v(Sa↓k) if a ∈ S1
In next definition we propose a value for j-cooperative games inspired with the ideas of the Banzhaf
value for cooperative games, [7]. The explicit formula for the proposed value depends on the
marginal contribution mj(v, S, a).
Definition 2.3 (A value for j-cooperative games) For any v ∈ JN and any player a ∈ N ,







mj(v, S, a). (1)
Its restriction to j-simple games is denoted here by b, and we then refer to the b-power index. It
was already considered in [11] for an arbitrary number of inputs j, and for j = 3 in [21, 20, 12, 18].
3 An axiomatization for the value
The first idea that comes to mind is whether Dubey and Shapley’s classic axioms or the adaptation
of them to j-cooperative games serve to characterize the considered value. This is the purpose of
the paper.
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It is not difficult to verify that these axioms are met for the considered value and it is also
simple to realize that these axioms are not enough to uniquely characterize it. In cooperative
games the axioms of total power, equal treatment and that of null player determine the Banzhaf
value on the unanimity games, which by induction and the axiom of additivity (or transfer for
simple games) uniquely extend the value to the rest of games.
3.1 Axioms naturally extended from cooperative games
In the following, ψ : JN → Rn is a value for j-cooperative games.
Equal Treatment (ET) The value ψ satisfies equal treatment if for any a, b ∈ N and game
v ∈ JN it holds:
ψa(v) = ψb(v)
if a and b are equivalent.
Two players a and b are equivalent if for every S such that {a, b} ⊆ S1 it holds mk(v, S, a) =
mk(v, S, b) for all k = 2, . . . , j.
Null Player (N) The value ψ satisfies the null player axiom if given a null player a in the game
v, then
ψa(v) = 0.
Player a is null in the j-cooperative game v ∈ JN if mj(v, S, a) = 0 for all S with a ∈ S1.
Additivity (Ad) The value ψ satisfies additivity if for any v, w ∈ JN
ψ(v + w) = ψ(v) + ψ(w).
Transfer (T) The index ψ satisfies transfer if for any v, w ∈ SJN
ψ(v) + ψ(w) = ψ(v ∧ w) + ψ(v ∨ w),
where (v ∧ w)(S) = min{v(S), w(S)} and (v ∨ w)(S) = max{v(S), w(S)} for all S ∈ JN .
We remark that a stronger condition that can replace equal treatment in Theorem 3.5 is
anonymity. The value ψ satisfies anonymity if for all game v ∈ JN , any permutation π of N
and any a ∈ N it holds ψa(v) = ψπ(a)(πv), where (πv)(S) = v(π(S)).
The conjunction, v ∧ w, and the disjunction, v ∨ w verify the following properties:
a. W (v ∧ w) = W (v) ∪W (w) and W (v ∨ w) = W (v) ∩W (w);
b. if Wm(v) = {S1, . . . , Sk} then v = uS1 ∧ · · · ∧ uSk ;
c. given two unanimity games uS and uT , then their conjunction is still a unanimity game and
uS ∧ uT = uZ where the j-partition Z is obtained from S and T as follows: a ∈ Zi if and
only if either a ∈ Si and a ∈ Th with h ≤ i or a ∈ Ti and a ∈ Sh with h ≤ i.
The next result is a simple check that is left to the reader.
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Lemma 3.1 i) The B-value for j-cooperative games satisfies the axioms of: equal treatment,
null player and additivity.
ii) The b-power index for j-simple games satisfies the axioms of: equal treatment, null player
and transfer.
Note that both B and the b-power index satisfy the transfer axiom because the sets of j-
cooperative and j-simple games are respective lattices with the operations of conjunction and
disjunction that have a maximal and a minimal element, see [8]. Moreover, the property of
additivity is also verified by B.
We propose two new axioms on unanimity games that together with the other three uniquely
characterize the B-value and the b-power index for j-cooperative games and j-simple games re-
spectively.
3.2 Two axioms on unanimity games
Now we introduce two new axioms that concern unanimity games. Let S be a j-partition with
a ∈ S1 and uS be the unanimity game of the j-partition S. In the first axiom below, it is understood
that uSa↓1 = uS, i.e., as a remains in the first level of approval, the j-partition S remains invariant.
No loss when voting at a lower level A value or index ψ satisfies the no loss (when voting at
a lower level) axiom if for any unanimity game uS with a ∈ S1 and i < j − 1 it holds
ψa(uSa↓i) = ψa(uSa↓(i+1)).
Note that the previous axiom only has sense for j ≥ 3.
Let S 6= N be an arbitrary j-partition, the harmonic cardinality of S by the importance of the





so that the importance of the input when voting is highlighted by the harmonic weights: the higher
the level of approval, the greater the harmonic cardinal.
The structural decisiveness index of a j-simple game, natural extension of this notion for simple




and gives a measure in between 0 and 1 about the cost of passing decisions in the game, assuming
uniform distribution over all j-partitions.
Note that if S ⊂j T it holds h(S) < h(T ) and δ(uS) > δ(uT ).
Total power on unanimity games An index ψ satisfies the total power on unanimity games if
for any j-tripartition S 6= N it holds∑
a∈N
ψa(uS) = j · δ(uS) · h(S)
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The last axiom expresses that the total power on any unanimity game is the product of:
a. the number of input alternatives j,
b. the structural decisiveness of the game uS, and
c. the harmonic cardinality of S.
Different from what happens with the no loss axiom, this one is valid for j ≥ 2.
The following consecutive trivial lemmas give sense to what we pursue, by its simplicity we
omit their proofs that consist of checking that the B-value (or b-power index when we are restricted
to j-simple games) as defined in (1) satisfies some properties.





δ(uS), if i < j
0, if i = j
Proof: In the game uS, S is the unique minimal winning j-partition. The rest of winning j-
partitions in uS are obtained by shifting players from lower levels to upper levels. Thus, |W (uS)|
depends only on the positions of the players in S and it results |W (uS)| =
∏j
k=1 k
sk . Only the
j-partitions T with a ∈ T1, uS(T ) = 1 and uS(Ta↓j) = 0 count for the Banzhaf value. Thus,
Ba(uS) = 0 if a ∈ Sj because a ∈ T1 and uS(T ) = 1 implies uS(Ta↓j) = 1, i.e., mj(uS, T, a) = 0 for
all j-partition T with a ∈ T1 ∩ Sj. Assume now, a /∈ Sj, then,



















By applying Proposition 3.2 we derive the following consequences.
Corollary 3.3 Both B and b satisfy the no loss axiom
ψa(uSa↓i) = ψa(uSa↓(i+1)),
with a ∈ S1 and i < j.










Corollary 3.4 Both B and b satisfy the total power axiom on unanimity games.


















Thus, the axioms of equal treatment, null player, total power and no loss uniquely characterize
the value on unanimity games, which by transfer (or also additivity for B) extend to the rest of
j-cooperative games or j-simple games as shown in the next result.
3.3 An axiomatic characterization
Theorem 3.5 Let j ≥ 3.
i) A value ψ on j-cooperative games satisfies equal treatment, null-player, total power on una-
nimity games, no loss for unanimity games and additivity axioms if and only if ψ = B.
ii) A value ψ on j-simple games satisfies equal treatment, null-player, total power on unanimity
games, no loss for unanimity games and transfer axioms if and only if ψ = b.
Note that for j = 2 (cooperative and simple games) the previous axiomatization remains valid by
removing the no loss axiom.
Proof: The proof is organized in five parts:
1) We have seen, in Lemma 3.1 and Corollaries 3.3 and 3.4, that both B and b satisfy the respective
axioms.
2) We now prove that a value, which satisfies the four first axioms becomes uniquely determined
on unanimity games.
Recall that M is the j-partition in which all voters choose the highest level of approval. Let




We will proceed by induction on unanimity games uS with a given common parameter d, which
can be interpreted as the number of one step-down for players necessary to convert M into S.
Consider uS. If d = 0 then S = M and the value on the unanimity game uM is uniquely
determined by anonymity and total power on the unanimity game uM. If d = 1 then there is a
unique a ∈ N such that a ∈ S2 and S1 = N \ {a}. The value of a in uS is determined by the no
loss axiom, which coincides with the value of a in uM, the value of players in S1 is then determined
by equal treatment and total power on the unanimity game uS.
Assume the assumption is true for all games uT with a parameter d for T . Let us prove the
statement for all games uS with a parameter d + 1 for S. The value in uS for players in Sj is
zero for the null-player axiom, the value in uS for players in Si for every 1 < i < j coincide, by
the no loss axiom, with the value these players have in uT , where T is obtained from S by only
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changing the position of the involved player in Si to the immediate higher level of approval i− 1.
By induction hypothesis, such value in uT is uniquely determined so it is also in uS. The value in
uS of players in S1 is then uniquely determined by equal treatment and total power on uS. As we
deal with j-simple games this proof is valid for both B and b.
3) The unanimity games form a basis of the vectorial space JN of dimension jn − 1.
If v is any j-cooperative game, then there exist jn − 1 real numbers cS, which are uniquely





The existence and uniqueness of these coefficients follow by applying equation (2) to any arbi-





Then it results a system of jn − 1 linear equations with jn − 1 unknowns, the numbers cS with
S 6= N . The resulting matrix, obtained by ordering the images of the characteristic function v in
lexicographic order1 is triangular superior, i.e. zeros under the diagonal, and all the numbers in
the diagonal are ones.
Thus, the determinant is one and therefore the linear system is compatible determined. Thus,
the coefficients cS are uniquely determined
2. By additivity and Equation (2) the value of ψ in an
arbitrary game v is determined by the value of ψ on unanimity games.
4) By the transfer axiom the value is uniquely extended to the rest of j-cooperative games.
Let Wm(v) = {S1, S2, . . . , Sk}. We proceed by induction on the number k of minimal winning
j-partitions. If k = 1 the game is a unanimity game and therefore uniquely determined for ψ.
Assume the hypothesis is true for all integer lower than k. As ψ satisfies the transfer axiom we
have:
ψ(v) = ψ(uS1) + ψ(uS2 ∨ · · · ∨ uSk)− ψ(uS1 ∧ uS1 ∧ · · · ∧ uSk).
As the conjunction of unanimity games is a unanimity game it results
ψ(v) = ψ(uS1) + ψ(uS2 ∨ · · · ∨ uSk)− ψ(uZ).
where the j-partition Z is such that a ∈ Zi if i is the greatest level of approval to which a belongs
to in the j-partitions Sh for h = 1, . . . , k.
The value ψ is uniquely determined on v since the number of minimal winning j-partitions in
the games: v, uS2 ∨ · · · ∨ uSk and uZ are lower than k.
5) By 1) B and b satisfy the respective axioms stated. By 2) they are uniquely determined on
unanimity games. By 3) B uniquely extends to the rest of j-cooperative games. By 4) b uniquely
extends to the rest of j-simple games.

1S precedes T in the lexicographic order if for the smallest p ∈ N such that p ∈ Si and p ∈ Th with i 6= h, it
holds i < h.









It is very simple to verify the independence of these axioms for arbitrary values of j, as shown
in [2] for the particular case of 3-simple games. The extensions of the examples used there for
greater values of j becomes trivial. Of course, when j = 2 the value B for j-cooperative games
coincides with the known Banzhaf value for cooperative games as considered by Owen [17].
4 Examples
Example 1.1 revisited It is a straightforward check that the B value is (2, 1, 1), i.e., the qualified
worker must receive twice as much as any of the other two.
Example 1.2 revisited By the equal treatment property the tests b and c have the same








= Bb = Bc







= Bb = Bc
Thus, the rankings of B for players are different for the two assumptions.
Example 1.3 revisited Recall that for the UNSC voting system the winning tripartitions S
satisfy
|S1| ≥ 9 and S3 ∩ P = ∅.
And for the proposed reform of the UNSC voting system the winning tripartitions S satisfy
either |S1| ≥ 14 or 13 ≥ |S1| ≥ 9 and S3 ∩ P = ∅.
In both models there are more than 14, 3 million of tripartitions with a given member voting ‘yes’.
The difference between the two models is that the 5 tripartitions (N \ {p}, ∅, {p}) where p is a
permanent member, which are losing in the classical model become winning in the new one, which
has two effects when computing b.
For a rotatory member the number of new winning tripartitions that convert into losing when
the member changes her vote from ‘yes’ to ‘no’ are 5: (N \{p}, ∅, {p}) for each permanent member
p.
For a permanent member the number of new winning tripartitions that convert into losing when
the member changes her vote from ‘yes’ to ‘no’ are 4: (N \ {p}, ∅, {p}) for any other permanent
member p, but the winning tripartitionM remain winning if p changes her vote from ‘yes’ to ‘no’.
Thus when computing the index b for a permanent member in the reformed system, the numer-
ator in Equation (1) is increased by 3 with respect to the numerator for the classical system, this
increase for a rotatory member is 5. The index b is computed in [12] for the UNSC voting system
resulting that the proportion of power between a permanent member and a rotatory member is
bp/br ≈ 2.04 that hardly suffers variation for the reformed system. That is, permanent members
could lose their right to veto without having their a priori Banzhaf power altered.
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5 Conclusion
The value proposed in this paper for j-cooperative games has ingredients to be a generalization
of the Banzhaf value. Among the arguments supporting the value proposed here we can find the
following: it is consistent in its particularization from j-cooperative games to j-simple games;
it admits a simple explicit formula in terms of the characteristic function; it is supported by
an axiomatic characterization which is close to the first characterization of the Banzhaf value in
cooperative and simple games. Alternatively, other interesting axiomatizations could be studied.
The capacity of theoretical studies and applications of the value on the contexts described is
high and future research is encouraged. Just to mention here a comment for 3-simple games with
abstention, if there is certainty or intuition about the probability of abstention then the b-power
index should be redefined accordingly to the probabilities of each input alternative. This comment
extends to arbitrary values of j when there is some evidence on the asymmetry in choosing different
levels of approval by the voters.
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